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Adedokun Olatokunbo Ogunfolu
A Legal Appraisal of the West African Free Trade Area
Introduction
African countries after independence in the latter half of the twentieth century embraced
the formation of Free Trade Areas (FTAs), provided for under Article XXIV of the General
Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT 1947), as an exception to Article I Most Favored Nation
(MFN) clause. FTAs were the adopted anodyne to reverse systemic underdevelopment wrought
by departing colonialists from Europe and the emergence of the European Union. 1 Sub-Saharan
Africa encompasses West Africa, and accounted for 1.1 per cent of world trade in 1991. 2 West
African share of world exports with the exception of Nigeria fell from 1.6% in 1980 to 0.6 per
cent in 2006. 3 In 1963 Africa’s share of world exports was 5.7 per cent and imports accounted
for 5.2 per cent, while in 2006 Africa’s share of exports had declined to 3.1 per cent and imports
2.4 per cent. 4
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 5 FTA is relatively
unknown in the United States, unlike the

North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), which

came into effect on January 1, 1994. 6 ECOWAS is a model FTA on the successful abolition of

1

Jon H. Sylvester, Sub‐Saharan Africa: Economic Stagnation, Political Disintegration, and the Specter of
Recolonization, 27 Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 1299 at 1321, (1993‐1994).
2
Id. at 1321.
3
Africa and World Trade: Sub‐Saharan Africa’s falling share of world trade, European Centre for International
Political Economy, (ECIPE) Media Briefing Note 1/2007, http://www.ecipe.org/press/Briefing%20note%20‐
%20Africa%20and%20world%20trade.pdf (Last visited Feb. 22, 2009)
4
Id. 2.
5
Kofi Oteng Kufour, Public Choice Theory and the Failure of the ECOWAS Trade Liberalization Scheme,23(4) World
Competition, 137‐154(2000).
6
Claude E. Barfield, Regionalism and US Trade Policy, in The Economics of Preferential Trade Agreements 136‐
159(Jagdish Bhagwati and Arvind Panagariya eds., 1996).
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visas amongst its members. 7 A brief history of western dominated international trade regime is
necessary, in order to understand why West African countries’ attempts to form a customs union
resulted into a free trade area.
This paper analyzes the debate whether FTAs create trade or distort trade, and examines
the arguments around their role in facilitating the growth pace of developing countries. The
impact of the World Trade Organization (WTO) on developing countries is analyzed through the
prism of the constructive school of international relations, and the normative constructs of the
realist school. The paper appraises the international economic law regime, through the
establishment of ECOWAS in 1975 by fifteen contiguous states in West Africa, to promote interregional trade and remove all barriers to labor, capital and ultimately establish a single currency
for its fifteen countries. A critical legal analysis is carried out on the implementation of the goals
of ECOWAS, and the modification of its treaty through additional protocols; to guarantee, peace,
security and democracy in West Africa as a sine qua non for engaging the global economic
community in a symbiotic relationship.
The paper concludes that ECOWAS has achieved peace and democracy in West
Africa, despite limited resources, but its percentage share of world trade fell from 1.6 per cent in
1980 to 0.6 per cent in 2006, excluding oil exporting members. The paper observes that
ECOWAS has a lot of homework to do in lowering rules of origin requirements for goods
manufactured in its member countries, provision of public infrastructure, enabling access to
credit by entrepreneurs, in order to promote regional trade and access to the global economy.

7

Jean‐Christophe Maur, Regionalism and Trade Facilitation: A Primer, 42, no.6 Journal of World Trade
979,993(2008).
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I. Historical Background of FTAs
The lessons learnt by the United States from the most protectionist law in American trade
history, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, led to the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act
(RTAA) of 1934 crafted by Cordell Hull’s attempt to promote free trade. 8 It was imperative that
American “beggar-my-neighbor” 9 trade policies had to be reversed. This was the driving
philosophy of the International Trade Organization (ITO) promoted by the United States to
prevent another world war like the Second World War which the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act had
inadvertently caused. 10 The United States attempted to globalize the RTAA under a multilateral
system like the Breton Woods institutions of the World Bank and the International Monetary
Fund, created out of a compromise between the American Dollar and British Pound supported by
gold reserves. 11
In negotiations over the ITO, Britain and the United States failed to reach a compromise
over trade preferences established by Britain throughout the Commonwealth. 12
One of the prime post World War II objectives of the United States was the dismantling
of trade preferences especially the Commonwealth system…The United States’ preoccupation
with Commonwealth preferences was so intense that an administrative spokesman told Congress
in 1947 that eliminating these preferences was almost a sine qua non of success at the Geneva
Conference. Failure to achieve this result has been blamed as one of the causes for the failure of
the United States to accept the Havana Charter, thus causing the ITO to fail to materialize 13
What emerged from the ITO was the accidental birth 14 of a side agreement, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). “The Geneva negotiations of 1947 set the precedent

8

John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT 251 (1969).
Id. at 9.
10
Joan E. Spero and Jeffrey A. Hart, The Politics of International Economic Relations, 50‐51 (1997).
11
Id. at 51.
12
Id. at 51.
13
See Jackson, supra note 8, at 251.
14
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law 25 (2008).
9
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for subsequent ‘Rounds’-eight in all throughout the life of the GATT as an organization- that
played a major part in the development of international trade law in the second half of the
twentieth century.” 15 Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, Chile, Cuba, India, Lebanon, Pakistan, Southern
Rhodesia and Syria were foundation members of GATT from the developing world. Southern
Rhodesia was still a colony which attained independence in 1980 as Zimbabwe.
Customs unions (CUs) 16 and free trade areas (FTAs) 17 are exceptions to the Most
Favored Nation (MFN) 18 concept of the WTO GATT Article I. A CU is difficult to attain; hence
the European Union 19 stands out as one of the rare examples of a successful CU. 20 A CU
requires all its members to adopt the same tariff against countries outside their union, while FTA
members retain external tariffs against third countries and both CU and FTAs must eliminate
duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce on substantially all the trade amongst its
members. Substantially all the trade has not been defined by either a Panel or Appellate Body of
the WTO. 21 The Panel in the Turkey-Textiles case had assumed Turkey was in a customs union
with the European Community and the Appellate Body held that the issue of whether Turkey met
the requirements of paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a) of Article XXIV of GATT 1994 was not before it. 22

15

Id. at 27.
See the seminal work of Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue 41‐108 (1950).
17
Anne O. Kruger Free Trade Agreements as Protectionist Devices: Rules of Origin, in The WTO and Reciprocal
Preferential Trading Agreements 511 (Caroline Freund ed., 2007).
18
Jacob Viner, The Most Favored Clause in American Commercial Treaties, 32 The Journal of Political Economy101‐
129 (Feb. 1924).
19
The European Union was primarily created to put a stop to bloody wars between neighbours which climaxed in
World War II, http://europa.eu/abc/history/index_en.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2009); Gerhard Loibl, International
Economic Law, in International Law, 689, 714‐715 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., 2006).
20
The oldest customs union is the South African Customs Union (SACU) established in 1910 and presently
comprises of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland, http://www.sacu.int/ (last visited Feb. 3,
2009).
21
Editorial Board, The WTO Doha Round and Regionalism, 35, no.4 Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 297,298
(2008).
22
TURKEY‐RESTRICTIONS ON IMPORTS OF TEXTILES AND CLOTHING PRODUCTS WT/DS34/AB/R, October 22,1999,
Paragraph 60 Appellate Body, see full text at:
http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_highLightParent.asp?qu=%28%40meta%5FSymbol+WT%FCDS34%FCAB%FCR%2A+
16
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“The
2007 dispute panel of Brazil-Retreaded Tyres came as close as yet seen to tackling this issue
head-on.” 23 The Panel had ruled that a Brazilian export ban on retreaded tyres was inconsistent
with GATT Article XX:I and unjustifiable under Article XX(b) decided to exercise judicial
economy in respect of the European Communities’ separate claims which included non
compliance with the requirements of Article XXIV of GATT 1994. 24 The Appellate body also
decided to exercise judicial economy on making a pronouncement on the substantially all the
trade requirements of Article XXIV, 25 and upheld the Panel findings on Article XX, but for the
different reason that Brazil contravened the Chapeau of Article XX. 26
The debate revolves around whether FTAS are building blocks or stumbling blocks
within the multilateral trade regime of the WTO, or termites in the trading system. 27 Professor
Bhagwati has asserted that “FTAs are two faced: they free trade among members, but they
increase protection against nonmembers”. 28 An FTA must not impose higher duties than what
existed in the FTA members’ territories prior to the formation of the FTA. Trade creation effects
of FTAs, should in theory, outweigh the loss of trade by third countries. “Regionalization of
trade factors heavily into sustainable economic growth”, 29 which has been demonstrated by the
European Union and NAFTA.

and+not+RW%2A%29&doc=D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FWT%2FDS%2F34ABR%2EDOC%2EHTM&curdoc=3
&popTitle=WT%2FDS34%2FAB%2FR (Last visited Mar.22, 2009).
23
See footnote 21 above at 28.
24
BRAZIL‐MEASURES AFFECTING IMPORTS OF RETREADED TYRES WT/DS332/AB/R, December 3, 2007, Paragraph
254 Appellate Body, see full text at:
http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_highLightParent.asp?qu=%28%40meta%5FSymbol+WT%FCDS332%FCAB%FCR%2A
+and+not+RW%2A%29&doc=D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FWT%2FDS%2F332ABR%2EDOC%2EHTM&curdoc
=3&popTitle=WT%2FDS332%2FAB%2FR (Last visited Mar.22, 2009).
25
Id. at Paragraph 256.
26
Id. at Paragraph 258 (b) (ii).
27
Jagdish Bhagwati, Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade (2008).
28
Id. at 17.
29
Chantal Thomas, Poverty Reduction, Trade, and Rights, 18 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 1399, 1410 (2002‐2003).
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Lawrence Summers is “in favor of all lateral reductions in trade barriers, whether they be
multi, uni, bi, tri, plurilateral. Global liberalization may be best, but regional liberalization is very
likely to be good.” 30 He regards the debate about trade diversion proclivity of FTAs as
inconsequential and “find it surprising that this issue is taken seriously-in most other situations,
economists laugh off second best considerations and focus on direct impacts.”

31

This position

drew a sharp reaction from Bhagwati and Panagariya who responded that:
We may recall that, since Viner’s (1950) classic work, PTAs have been considered to be harmful
both to member countries whose imports are the subject of the trade diversion and to the world
under trade diversion and welfare-enhancing under trade creation. This ambiguity of outcomes,
depending on the relative strengths of the two effects when a PTA is formed, has been the
principal reason for the debate among economists as to whether a specific PTA is desirable.” 32
Robert Pahre a realist asserts that, “regionalism takes away an important motive for global
negotiations such as a proposed new round of the WTO.”

33

Hudec and Southwick made a valid

conclusion in 1999 which is still valid today: “The jury is still out on whether the proliferation of
RTAs advances trade liberalization or allows for an increasingly tangled web of trade-distorting
preferential regimes.” 34
II. Framework of GATT and FTAs
A. The Most Favored Nation Clause

30

Larry H. Summers, Regionalism and the World Trading System in , The WTO and Reciprocal Preferential Trading
Agreements,420,421(Caroline Freund ed., 2007).
31
Id. at 425.
32
J. Bhagwati and A. Panagariya, Preferential Trading Areas and Multilateralism: Strangers, Friends or Foes?, in The
WTO and Reciprocal Preferential Trading Agreements,93,100(Caroline Freund, ed., 2007).
33
Robert Padre, Most‐Favored‐Nation Clauses and Clustered Negotiation, in The Rational Design of International
Institutions, 129(Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and Duncan Snidal, eds., 2004).
34
Robert E. Hudec and James D. Southwick, Regionalism and WTO Rules: Problems in the Fine Art of Discriminating
Fairly in Trade Rules in the Making: Challenges in Regional and Multilateral Negotiations, 47,79(Miguel Rodriguez
Mendoza, Patrick Low and Barbara Kotschwar, eds., 1999).
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The most favored nation (MFN) clause developed during the seventeenth century 35 as a
common practice of nations to insert in their trade treaties a commercial provision36 having the
effect of present day MFN clauses. A conditional MFN was introduced by the American treaty
with France on February 6, 1778 which set the United States apart from other nations until 1923
when it adopted unconditional MFN. 37 “Simply put, the MFN principle required that every trade
advantage given to any country (GATT member or not) must be given, immediately and
unconditionally, to every other GATT member.” 38 The conditional MFN came back during the
Tokyo Round in 1979 in the form of the Government Procurement Code, and the Subsidies Code
in favor of developing countries which was strongly resisted by the United States. 39
The conditional MFN issue remained dormant for the rest of the 1980s. As the Uruguay Round
moved toward its conclusion, however, some developed country governments once again began
to speak about “free riders.” By the time of the Dunkel text” in December 1991, the issue had
produced a radical demand that all GATT members sign all GATT texts, or else leave GATT
altogether. 40
Marrakesh Morocco was the place where the Uruguay Round was concluded on April 15, 1994
which led to the emergence of the World Trade Organization on January 1, 1995. 41
B. The Codification of Free Trade Areas under GATT 1947
The key exceptions to the MFN clause were retention of colonial preferences, formation
of customs union and free trade areas. 42 The genesis of the free trade area exception can be

35

Jacob Viner, Studies in the Theory of International Trade 63 (1965).
See Viner, supra note 16, at 101.
37
Id. 101‐102
38
Robert E. Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law: The Evolution of the Modern GATT Legal System 6 (1993).
39
Id. at 121‐122.
40
Id. at 123.
41
See Lowenfeld, supra note 14 at 73.
42
See Hudec, supra note 38 at 6.
36
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traced to the following extract from a secret agreement between Canada and the United States of
America. 43
…deviation from the orthodox customs union…would not conform to that part of the
definition of a customs union in Art. 42, par. 4 of the Charter and Art. XXIV, par. 4 of
GATT which specifies that substantially the same tariffs and other regulations of
commerce must be applied by each of the members to the trade of third countries. 44
The US employed subterfuge to support French amendments for Lebanese and Syrian demands
for a modified custom union to introduce FTA exception. 45 Article XXIV( 8) (a) of GATT
provides that a customs union shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single customs
territory for two or more customs territories, so that (i) duties and other restrictive regulations of
commerce (except where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI-XV and XX) are
eliminated with respect to substantially all the trade between the constituent territories of the
union or at least substantially all the trade in products originating from the territories.(ii) A
common tariff must be applied by all constituent parts of the custom union to external trade.
Article XXIV (8) (b) of GATT provides that a free -trade area shall be understood to
mean a group of two or more customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive
regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, 46 XII, 47
XIII, 48 XIV 49 , XV 50 and XX 51 ) are eliminated on substantially all the trade between the
constituent territories in products originating in such territories. Free Trade Areas (FTAs) are

43

Kerry Chase, Multilateralism Compromised: the mysterious origins of GATT Article XXIV, 5 World Trade Review 1,
1‐30(2006).
44
Id. at 14.
45
Id. at 14‐15.
46
General elimination of quantitative restrictions.
47
Restrictions to safeguard balance of payment
48
Non‐discriminatory administration of quantitative restrictions.
49
Exceptions to the rule of non‐discrimination.
50
Foreign exchange arrangements with the International Monetary Fund.
51
General exceptions.
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relatively easier to establish, and with the failures of the Doha rounds of the WTO from 2001 to
2008, over 400 FTAs are projected to be active by 2010.
C. Domination of World Trade by the United States and the European Union
According to the constructive school of international relations the domineering influence
of the United States within the world global trading system has been attained by

subtle

projection of American values on the world community. This has been to create a world trading
system in synchronization with the prevalent ideals of American trading interests. According to
Ethan Kapstein:
Just as individuals seek insurance or risk sharing mechanisms to tide them over when a crisis
strikes, so states seek such devices in the form of military alliances, customs unions, and trade
agreements and making it costly to escape from them, the insurance and or risk-sharing qualities
are greatly enhanced. 52
The United States has utilized the mantras of fairness and justice to shield its trade interests and
it becomes problematic when the United States has emerged as the sole super power and the
largest economy in the world with a greater temptation to act unilaterally. 53
Gregory Shaffer in his construct succinctly appraised the overwhelming negative influence
exerted by the European Union and the United States on developing countries in trade relations.
According to him:
The United States and EU are able to combine market power and their ability to forum-shift with
vast material and informational resources that they deploy to their advantage in the drafting and
application of WTO rules…As a result, the United States and EU have fashioned rules whereby
they continue to protect and subsidize their domestic producers in the agricultural and textile
sectors, while developing countries agreed to more costly commitments…The United States still
applies an average tariff rate of 14 percent to goods from Bangladesh (primarily textile
products), but only 1 percent to imports from France. In contrast, developing country
52

Ethan B. Kapstein, Power, fairness and the global, in Power in Global Governance 98 (Michael Barnett and
Raymond Duvall eds., 2005).
53
Id. at 100‐101. (national 100 security 101).
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implementation of the TRIPS Agreement is estimated to result in wealth transfers from
developing countries to the United States of around $5.8 billion per year. 54
According to Peter Rosendorff and Helen Milner of the realist school of international relations:
The first instance of an antidumping law was Canada’s 1904 dumping regime. In 1947 the
United States instituted the world’s safeguard clause…In the realm of safeguard clauses, for
example, it is the United States that has the oldest laws and has been the most vocal proponent of
them in international trade negotiations. U.S. trade law puts the escape clause into practice
through Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974…This practice has been followed closely in
GATT largely at the United States’ insistence. Article XIX of GATT permits a member to escape
from its obligations not to raise trade barriers when one of its industries is suffering an economic
downturn and is experiencing “serious injury.” In the realm of antidumping and countervailing
duties the same association is apparent. U.S. and Canadian laws have preceded international ones
and set the pattern for them. Article VI of GATT, and the Second Antidumping Code of the
Tokyo Round, which define practice in antidumping and countervailing duty law, allows
member states to apply duties when imports are sold at “less than fair value,” following U.S.
practice. 55
D. United States Subsidies and West African Cotton
Cotton farming is the lifeline of ten million West Africans and comprises a sizeable
chunk of export revenues of the non petroleum exporting countries in the region. 56 It accounts
for 90 percent of export revenues of Benin and the farming method and quality of ginnery ranks
as the best in the world. 57 Burkina Faso is one of the poorest countries in world and 2 million of
its citizens dependent on cotton were threatened with starvation by United States cotton
subsidies. 58 A World Trade Organization panel ruled in September 2004 that annual cotton
subsidies of $3.2billion and $1.6billion in export subsidies paid by the United States had

54

Gregory Shaffer, Power, governance and the WTO, in Power in Global Governance 134 (Michael Barnett and
Raymond Duvall eds., 2005).
55
B. Peter Rosendorff and Helen V. Milner, The Optional Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty
and Escape, in The Rational Design of International Institutions, 83 (Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson and
Duncan Snidal, eds., 2004).
56
ICTSD, OXFAM and IDEAS Centre Dialogue, Geneva, Can Negotiations on Agriculture Deliver Pro‐Development
Reforms? The Case of West African Cotton (June 17, 2003).
57
Id.
58
CIA, The World fact Book https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the‐world‐factbook/geos/uv.html (Last
visited Mar. 22, 2009).
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contravened WTO rules. 59 The ruling was confirmed by the Appellate Body of the WTO on
March 3, 2005. 60 Brazil initiated the complaint in 2002, Benin and Chad both from West Africa,
signed on as third parties. The chicken had come home to roost and United States’ strong
tradition of compliance with WTO decisions has resulted in a gradual scale back of subsidies to
its cotton farmers. 61
Do not forget either that the first agricultural waiver from GATT discipline was secured by the
United States in 1955, effectively leading to the chaotic situation in agriculture today. The
United States was also among the earliest countries to start restricting textile imports, initiating
the descent down the road to the Multi-fibre Arrangement (MFA) that restricts and regulates
exports of textiles and clothing from developing to developed countries. 62
Millions of West Africans employed in their decimated textile industry, lost their jobs as a result
of this factor. 63 In 2005 at the Doha negotiation rounds of the WTO IN Hong Kong, the West
African nations of Burkina Faso, Chad, Benin and Mali on behalf of thirty African producers of
cotton advocated for a reduction of the high agricultural tariffs in the west. 64
In agriculture – a sector that was a late comer to rules of multilateral trade – and which lags some
50 odd years behind the industrial, much of the developing world has placed its aspirations. The
various forms of subsidies that the rich world had given to its producers, have crowded out
59

US Cotton Subsidies Declared Illegal by WTO, Again, Oxfam America,
http://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpublications/press_releases/archive‐2005/wto_cotton_ruling (Last Visited
Mar.21, 2009).
60
United States –Subsidies on Upland Cotton WT/DS267/AB/R see full text at:
http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_highLightParent.asp?qu=%40meta%5FSymbol+%28WT%FCDS267%FC%2A%29+an
d+%28AB%29+and+not+%28RW%2A%29+and+%28%28+%40Doc%5FDate+%3E%3D+2005%2F01%2F01+00%3A00
%3A00+%29+and+%28+%40Doc%5FDate+%3C%3D+2005%2F12%2F31+23%3A59%3A59+%29%29&doc=D%3A%2F
DDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FWT%2FDS%2F267ABR%2EDOC%2EHTM&curdoc=3&popTitle=WT%2FDS267%2FAB%2F
R (Last visited Mar.2009)
61
Elinor Lynn Heinisch, West Africa versus the United States on Cotton Subsidies: how, why and what next?,
44,no.2 Journal of Modern African Studies 251,253(2006).
62
Jagdish N. Bhagwati, United States Trade Policy at the Crossroads, 12 no.4 The World Economy,339,462‐
463(1989).
63
World Bank Development Report 1998, see full text at http://www‐
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/1998/11/17/000178830_98111703550058/Ren
dered/PDF/multi0page.pdf (Last visited Mar.20, 2009).
64
Pascal Lamy, WTO Director General , Opening Address, Twelfth Session of the Steering Committee –
Parliamentary Conference on the WTO June 22, 2006 http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl30_e.htm
(Last visited Mar.21,2009).
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African and other farmers from international markets, putting the breaks (sic) on their
agricultural trade…While the average tariff worldwide on industrial goods is only 5%, it is 60%
on the agricultural. In launching the Doha Round, the developing world insisted that these
imbalances be corrected, and has since been very active in the negotiations. 65
Success at the Doha Rounds would eliminate the multibillion dollar farm subsidies in
developed countries, which destroy investments of farmers and their livelihood in Africa. 66
“Developing countries now have lower tariffs for agricultural products than developed states
and…are exposed to highly subsidized products entering their markets at price that undercut
local producers.” 67 The WTO Agreement on Agriculture came into force on January 1, 1995, and
effectively retained a bound tariff of 60% on agriculture products for Europe and the United
States. 68 The United States started providing huge subsidies for its farmers during the “Great
Depression in the 1930s. In Europe they began in the aftermath of the Second World War and
with the establishment of the European Community.” 69 Fairer WTO rules regulating agriculture
subsidies and tariffs would dramatically improve the competitiveness of African agriculture and
eliminate the reliance on imported food. 70 A successful Doha Round will improve income level
of farmers in the developing world. 71
E. TRIPS

65

Id.
Jean‐Pierre Chaffour, Global Food Crisis: Trade Policy Origins and Options, Trade Note 34, World Bank 7(July 24,
2008) http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/239054‐
1126812419270/Trade_Note_34_Jul_24_08.pdf (Last visited Mar.22, 2009).
67
Penelope Simons, Binding the Hand that Feeds Them: The Agreement on Agriculture, Transnational Corporations
and the Right to Adequate Food in Developing Countries, in Redefining Sovereignty in International Economic Law,
399, 410 (Wenshua Shan, Penelope Simons and Dalvinder Singh, eds., 2008).
68
Agreement on Agriculture, see full text at: http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/14‐ag.pdf (Last visited
Mar. 21, 2009).
69
G. Edward Schuh, Developing country interests in WTO, In The Political Economy of International Trade Law:
Essays Honour of Robert E. Hudec,435,436(Daniel L.M. Kennedy and James D. Southwick eds., 2002).
70
World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 2009: Commodities at the Crossroads,13, see full text at:
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGEP2009/Resources/10363_WebPDF‐w47.pdf (Last visited Mar.22,2009).
71
Id. at 97.
66
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Developing countries which had focused on development for half a century, either failed
to understand the implications of incorporating patent and copyright protection into WTO’s
binding obligations, or Article II (4) of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization tied their hands. 72 Put simply they had a choice to be bound under GATT 1947
which dealt only with physical goods or sign up to GATT 1994 with its attached multilateral
agreements on services, patents and copyrights as one package. 73 The United States had opted
for GATT 1994 after the required six month notice, and most developing countries had to jump
unto the same boat with the United States the largest trading economy in the world. 74 “The
problem is that there is no ground for a presumption that the TRIPS agreement will increase
world economic welfare…” 75 At a World Intellectual Property Organization meeting in 1987,
Brazil, Cuba, France and India opposed the suggestion by the United States of including
counterfeiting measures within GATT and felt such measures should be left to WIPO
mechanism. The position of the intelligentsia in the United States during this era can be summed
up as follows:
Inclusion of an anti-counterfeiting code in the GATT would send a signal to infringing countries
that the United States intends to take concrete action to help the motion picture and similar
situated industries. It would also be a comparatively easy place for the United States to begin
implementing a protective program because the GATT- and any code promulgated under itdeals with tangible goods, rather than more intangible efforts such as opening markets abroad
and halting piracy. 76
It was the private lobby led by heads of Pfizer, IBM and the Motion Picture Association
of America that prevailed on the Reagan administration and effectively won the heart and mind

72

Brian Hindley, What Subjects are suitable for WTO agreements? In The Political Economy of International Trade
Law: Essays in Honor of Robert E. Hudec, 157,158(Daniel L. M. Kennedy and James D. Southwick eds., 2002).
73
Id. at 158.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 168.
76
Jan D’Alessandro, A Trade‐Based Response to Intellectual Property Piracy: A Comprehensive Plan to Aid the
Motion Picture Industry, 76G.L.J.460 (1987‐1988).
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of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) 77 to incorporate TRIPS into the WTO. 78 The
USTR is a cabinet level official and “the President’s principal trade advisor, negotiator and
spokesperson on trade issues.”

79

These constellations of private interests persuaded the United

States to join the Berne Convention which it had been very reluctant to join. 80 The United States
had to amend its law to join the Berne Convention in 1989, after a hundred years of the existence
of the convention. 81
The WTO structure hermetically locked out technological progress of developing
countries through the Agreement on Trade- Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS). 82 TRIPS came into force on January 1, 1996, but on January 1, 2006 in Least
Developed Countries (LDCs). 83 It is compulsory for any country that wants to join the WTO to
also sign up to TRIPS. “Reservations may not be entered in respect of any of the provisions of
this Agreement without the consent of the other Members.” 84 There is The Doha Ministerial
Declaration of 2001 which permit countries to utilize compulsory licensing to produce generics
of expensive patented drugs, to guarantee the health of their citizens.85 East Asian phenomenal
development process imported technical knowhow 86 when intellectual properties rights had not
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been locked up by TRIPS 87
Evidence exist of “misguided protection in the transfer of textile technology to certain
African countries.” 88 The Chinese, Indians and Koreans émigrés workers and researchers in
western technology firms, bridged such hurdles through the appeal and support of their countries
to repatriate crosscutting technologies home as either as investors or as representatives of foreign
investors. 89 Former British colonies in West Africa like Ghana, Nigeria 90 and Sierra Leone have
always had robust laws securing trademarks, copyright and patents 91 and have failed to attract
the high levels of foreign direct investments of East Asia where similar laws were lacking until
TRIPS came into effect in 1996. 92 Srinivasan has established that, developing countries by
agreeing to TRIPS, have incurred huge costs and the concessions promised by developed
countries have not been met.93 “Reciprocal concessions proposed by the United States included a
commitment to pursue reductions in EC agricultural subsidies, and a commitment to pursue
reductions in textile quotas and to alleviate restrictions on the importation of tropical
products.” 94 These American carrots were coupled with the big stick of Section 301 actions and
a threat to “abandon the GATT altogether, if its negotiating agenda was not accepted.” 95
1. Special and Differential Treatment (S&D)
87
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The developing countries which became independent in the 1950s pressurized GATT
during its review session of 1954 to 1955 to redraft Article XVIII to protect their fledging infant
domestic industries to enable competition on fair terms with industrialized countries. 96 The
cascade of newly independent states in the early 1960s led to the formation of the developing
countries dominated United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)in 1964
as a rival to GATT; which influenced GATT to add a new Part IV entitled ‘Trade and
Development. 97 The Committee on Trade and Development (CTD) was set up by members of
GATT to administer Part IV; and from 1966 to 1971, CTD granted waivers for Australia’s tariff
preferences to developing countries for certain products, the developed countries’ General
System of Preferences (GSP) schemes in favor of developing countries, and lastly the waiver for
the Protocol for Trade Negotiations among sixteen developing countries. 98
To have a secure legal basis for the granting of preferences to and among developing countries,
the CONTRACTING PARTIES adopted the ‘Enabling Clause’ during the Tokyo Round of
Trade Negotiations. The clause is important as it placed the concept of S & D treatment at the
heart of the GATT legal system. 99
On June 15, 1999 the WTO granted least developed countries (LDCs) a waiver from Article I
paragraph I of GATT up till June 30, 2009 to enjoy preferential treatment. 100
2. African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) and European Union (EU)
France and Belgium in 1957 joined the European Community (EC) on the condition that
their former colonies should be coupled with the EC. 101 This led to the drafting of Lome I in
1975, out of the Rome Treaty and the 1963 Yaoundé Convention between the European Union
96
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and its former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP). 102

The EU-ACP

arrangement offered S&D treatment and was followed by Lome II in 1979, Lome III in 1984 and
Lome IV in 1989. From 1970 to 1993 ACP exports to Europe fell from 8.9 per cent to 3.1 per
cent and the ACP economies “have undergone precipitous declines.” 103 The position of the EU
on FTAs during the Uruguay Rounds in its Trade Policy Review of 1991 was:
The Community’s basic attitude in favor of the multilateral trade system has, of course since the
inception of the GATT, existed hand-in-hand with its enthusiastic support for and active
involvement in free trade arrangements of a regional character…For the Community there is
indeed no contradiction between these two positions. We have always believed that regional
trade arrangements complement the multilateral system and represent an intermediate step
towards the ideal of trade that is free of all customs duties and import restrictions among all
nations. Progress on a more limited, regional basis among countries with homogenous economies
and with close links in the geographical sense, may be the best achievable in the medium
term. 104
Trade between the first twelve members of the EU from 1958 to 1990 increased from 35 per cent
to 59 per cent while trade with most other countries fell and “the steepest decline was that of
ACP countries. 105 EU’s technical assistance to increase West African beef production was
undermined by EU beef exports to West Africa, while sugar refineries in ACP countries financed
by the EU got decimated by EU sugar exports. 106 The EU-ACP in response to WTO rules 107 and
the “Bananas Wars” 108 which divided Europe 109 came up with the Cotonou Agreement of 2000
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with twenty year life span. 110 The Agreement is subject to review every five years and was
signed at Luxembourg on June 25, 2005. 111 The EU has slightly modified its multilayered and
complex relationships with developing countries carved up into different geo-political regions.
Six EU Partnership Agreements (EPAs) have been concluded and four EPAs were to have come
into effect in four African economic regions on January 1, 2008. 112 Central Africa, East Africa,
Southern African Development Community and ECOWAS comprise the four regions which till
date have made little progress with the EPA arrangement. 113

The focus of this paper,

ECOWAS, 114 has had its EPA stalled due to the refusal of Nigeria to sign up because Europe did
not provide access to its market. 115 This raises the question once again whether the objectives of
the EPA were well thought out.
The objective of economic and trade cooperation is to promote the integration of the ACP
countries into the global economy, by enhancing production and the capacity to attract
investment, and ensuring conformity with WTO provisions, whilst taking account of respective
developmental constraints…The ACP-EC Agreement aims to support the mutually reinforcing
effects of economic and trade cooperation and development aid. 116
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Maybe the emphasis should have been on the elimination of numerous subsidies in Europe which
debar imports from West Africa to enable real development to occur. 117
III. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
This section traces the formation of ECOWAS and its evolution between 1975 and 2009. The
goals of ECOWAS are appraised against the backdrop of economic difficulties, diverse legal
systems, wars and political instability in West Africa. An evaluation of the ECOWAS Treaty is
carried out together with the additional protocols which were formulated to cope with subsequent
challenging circumstances in West Africa. This process helps in arriving at a performance
scorecard.
A. The Formation of ECOWAS
The first annual report of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) expressed concern
about the “economic groupings in Europe on African economies” and mandated its Executive
Secretary to:
…study and appraise the effects of economic groupings in Europe on industrialization in Africa,
intra-African trade and Africa’s economic development in general, and to recommend measures
necessary to offset any prejudicial effects of such economic groupings…” 118
In response to regional groupings in Europe, the ECA commissioned sub regional studies
throughout Africa and concluded that Africa’s development would be enhanced by sub-regional
groupings. 119 “The emphasis on regional groupings, however, did not mean that the various subregions were to be self-contained units. The goal should be an African common market
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embracing all countries of the continent.” 120
Concrete steps to form ECOWAS commenced at a Conference on Economic
Cooperation in West Africa, held by eleven West African States in Niamey, Niger Republic in
October 1966. 121 This was followed by another conference held in Ghana in 1967 which adopted
Articles of Association 122 presented by the ECA executive secretary, Robert Gardiner. He noted
that “branches of economic activities are closed to majority of West African countries due to
their small economic size.” 123 Fifteen West African states concluded the ECOWAS treaty from
27 to 28 May 1975 in Lagos, Nigeria and at Lome, Togo in November 1976; five protocols to the
ECOWAS treaty were signed. 124 ECOWAS has fifteen members made up of Benin, Burkina
Faso, Cape Verde, Cote D’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger,
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. 125 These are former British, French and Portuguese
colonies with disparate legal systems modeled on civil law and the common law greatly modified
by autochthonous circumstances.
1. Objectives of ECOWAS
ECOWAS treaty of May 28, 1978 was revised at Cotonou on July 24 1993. 126 The aims
of ECOWAS are to promote co-operation and integration leading to the establishment of a
customs union in West Africa in order to raise the living standards of its peoples and to maintain
enhanced economic stability, foster relations among its members while contributing to the
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progress and development of West Africa.

127

To achieve these objectives ECOWAS has sought

the harmonization and co-ordination of national policies through integration programmes in
agriculture, industry, transport, communications, energy, trade, finance, taxation, law
reform. 128 It attempts to harmonize and coordinate regional policies to protect the
environment. 129 The attempt to set up joint venture production enterprises has not been
attained. 130

ECOWAS has sought to liberalize trade among its members through the

abolition of import and export duties as well as the elimination of non-tariff barriers in West
Africa. 131 Very strict rules of origin have eliminated a large number of industries from
intraregional trade. 132 Nigeria accounts for 75 percent of ECOWAS exports and 45 percent of its
imports and if Nigeria is excluded intraregional trade rises to 20 percent. 133 Burkina Faso, Niger
and Mali which are landlocked have a higher level of intraregional trade. 134 Bhagwati asserts
that rules of origin make a mess of international division of labor in a global age. 135 Goods
produced in free trade zones or export processing zones shall in no case be considered as goods
emanating from ECOWAS members. 136 The goal of a common external tariff and a common
trade policy vis-à-vis third countries 137 has not been realised. Free movement of persons, goods,
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services, capital and right of residence have been realised by ECOWAS,

138

with the attainment

of its phased implementation. 139
2. Institutions of ECOWAS
The following institutions have been instrumental in the achievement of the objectives of
ECOWAS; the Authority of Heads of State and Government, 140 Council of Ministers,141
Community Parliament, 142 Economic and Social Council, 143 Court of Justice, 144 and the
Executive Secretariat 145 now known as the Commission. ECOWAS also established the
ECOWAS FUND for Cooperation, Compensation and Development (ECOWAS Fund) in its
treaty 146 and the ECOWAS Fund became operational in 1979. 147
In order to enhance the financial resources of the Fund through the opening to non-regional
partners, the Authority of Heads of State and Government at its twenty-second session held on 9
and 10 December 1999 decided to transform ECOWAS Fund into a regional holding company
called ECOWAS Bank for Investment and Development (EBID) with two specialized
subsidiaries, ECOWAS Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and ECOWAS Regional
Investment Bank (ERIB). The EBID Group became operational in 2003.148
ECOWAS Parliament came into existence in 2001 and the second legislature was inaugurated in
November 2006 with 115 seats divided amongst its members based on population size.149
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Nigeria has the highest number of thirty-five seats while Cape Verde, Gambia and Togo have
five seats each. 150
B. Trade Creation and a Common Market
ECOWAS accounts for half of the total ACP exports into Europe which comprise mainly
of raw agricultural products. 151 The abolition of tariff on European imports under the EU-ACP
EPAs will lead to a 70 per cent loss of tariff revenues by ACP countries and West Africa will be
the most affected region. 152 This might be compounded by the current global crisis rocking the
European Union. “The asymmetric nature of international trade and financial relations is such
that any change in performance in the industrialized countries is amplified in its effects on the
developing economies.” 153 ECOWAS needs to increase trade growth through greater integration
which spurs investment. 154 The Economic Commission for Africa observed in 1996 that
Integration presupposes development of transportation and communication linkages as well as
“investment in human resources.” 155 This was similar to its findings in 1961 in a study on
transport problems in West Africa in relation to economic development which stressed:
… the fact that hardly anywhere in Africa is there a fully integrated transport system permitting a
rational mode of transport best suited to demand. Since existing transport systems were primarily
developed to serve foreign trade, there is a marked lack of services catering for domestic
markets. 156
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1. Trade Barriers
ECOWAS comprises of a potpourri of Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone legal
systems modified by autochthonous circumstances of its fifteen members which has hindered
intraregional trade. “As a matter of fact very little work has been done in the area of
harmonization of law among African countries.” 157 The Francophone: Economic Community of
the States of Central Africa (CEEAC), Comite Permanent Consultatif du Maghreb (CPCM),
Central African Common Market (UDEAC) and the Anglophone East African Common Market
were adversely affected by lack of harmonization of the laws of the component members. 158
“Admittedly the effect of the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) has been
exceptional for regional economic organizations.” 159
At a 1960 London conference of the British Commonwealth on the future of law in
Africa, the challenge was how to synthesize numerous indigenous legal systems with various
strands of the common law bequeathed by Britain on its former colonies. 160 “The harmonization
of trade laws and commercial practices is an important ingredient of regional integration, without
which meaningful economic integration cannot be achieved.” 161 Other barriers to trade within
the ECOWAS region consist of poorly maintained road networks and insufficient penetration of
rural areas where most agricultural production takes place. 162 A border crossing in Africa is
equivalent to the cost of 1000 miles of inland travel in Africa and 100 miles of travel in
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Europe. 163 The economies of most states are small in size. 164 Ghana, Cote D’Ivoire and Nigeria
are the few exceptions. Multiple currencies and varying exchange rates also hinder commerce
within ECOWAS while telecommunications used to be a major problem until a few years
ago. 165 The major problems remain transiting by road across West Africa through numerous road
blocks manned by numerous uncoordinated agencies in each country. “There is no doubt… that
the continuing use of roadblocks constitutes a serious hindrance to the development of Intraunion
trade.” 166
International trade within West Africa is relatively little developed because countries of the
region are not economically complementary in any marked degree; their structures of demand
and production are not such that they can provide important markets and sources of supply for
one another…But as yet exporting capacity even in manufactures, continues to be more readily
absorbed overseas than in neighbouring countries. 167
Trade in agricultural produce amongst ECOWAS citizens dating back centuries, prior to colonial
rule has occurred across artificial colonial borders, oblivious of ECOWAS trade rules, “in
disregard of law.” 168 Citizens are obviously ahead of their leaders and bureaucrats in forging
ahead with intraregional commerce. The period from 1973 to 1993 witnessed the same volume
of intraregional trade within ECOWAS, showing that the formation of ECOWAS in 1975 did not
create more trade during the first eighteen years of its existence. 169 Rice, corn, sorghum, millet,
palm oil, groundnut oil, livestock and yams as well as petroleum formed the bulk of trade during
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this period. 170 Manufactured goods were marginal in volume and Europe supplied the bulk of
imports of manufactured goods mimicking the colonial template which discouraged intraregional
trade and local manufacturing.

171

External tariffs have fallen considerably in West Africa but

volume intra regional trade has not surpassed the ten percent peak attained in 1980. 172
C. Challenges Faced By ECOWAS
In the 1980s when African countries were in financial crisis, the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund administered a structural adjustment program that mandated
African countries to eliminate public spending on health and education; to balance their budgets
so as to qualify for loans to repay outstanding interest payments on loans sourced from western
private banks. The same prescription was administered upon every African country with varying
and different economic ailments. Elimination of public spending and scrapping of subsidies was
the solution to reviving African economies. West African countries were directed to eliminate
public spending on transport, roads, power and steel projects as well as communication,
university education and research. The SAP therapies destroyed public infrastructure and led to
massive decay of educational and health facilities 173 and electricity power projects collapsed and
drove manufacturing enterprises from Africa to Europe and emerging economies of Asia. These
therapies have assumed the umbrella term, “Washington Consensus”. 174 “Many subsidiaries of
French Banks went bankrupt in West Africa…forty-three of 139 British firms with industrial
170
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investments in Africa withdrew primarily from Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Kenya.” 175
There has been a palpable disconnect between ECOWAS and ordinary citizens as well as
the organized business sector. 176 Ironically it was the efforts of ECOWAS in peace enforcement
in Cote D’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone that brought it into public consciousness. Africa
experienced in the past two decades the most horrific nature of human misery wrought by armed
conflicts in Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mozambique,
Rwanda, Somalia, Uganda, and in West Africa, Cote D’Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone. 177
Liberia lost 250,000 and Sierra Leone, 75, 000 of its most precious resource, human capital. 178
On August 7, 1990, ECOWAS established the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG) to stop the Liberian civil war which started in 1989 and was destabilizing the West
African sub-region. 179 The United Nations Security Council gave a retroactive approval to the
actions of ECOMOG under Chapter VII provisions of the United Nations Charter. 180
On August 30, 1997, in Abuja the Nigerian capital, the twentieth summit of ECOWAS
deployed ECOMOG to stop the Sierra Leonean civil war and “restore the democratically elected
government of Tejan Kabbah. 181 ECOWAS during this period was also trying to sustain its less
than one per cent share of world trade and a very low level of intra-ECOWAS trade.
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above civil wars strained the limited financial resources of ECOWAS countries and the region is
still recovering from the devastation wrought on the economies of battle theatres and their
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neighbouring countries. Political instability is still a recurring decimal in West Africa and it has a
very negative effect on the economies of ECOWAS. In January 2009, Guinea was suspended
from ECOWAS pursuant to ECOWAS 2001 Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance after
the army assumed power. 183

The assassination on March 2, 2009 of the President of Guinea

Bissau brought this sad element to the fore again. 184 The Chairman of ECOWAS strongly
condemned the murder and ECOWAS initiated efforts to entrench democracy in Guinea
Bissau. 185 In March 2009, the ECOWAS President, Dr Chambas observed that:
For more than thirty years, ECOWAS has led this regional approach to economic
development …While some progress has been recorded, it is clear that not only does West Africa
remain poor and undeveloped, but regional integration is not at the centre of the national
development agenda; the potential of regionalism has not been properly explored and utilized.
The development of the region requires much more attention and effort than has been
forthcoming in the past. 186
This shows a chasm between national aspirations and regional integration in West Africa.
Conclusion and Recommendations for Reform
The WTO believes that there would be 400 FTAs existing in 2010, and the debate has
shifted from whether they are trade creating or distorting to how to utilise FTAs to reduce trade
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barriers within the WTO structure. 187 TRIPs is a global manifestation of how “the US
constitutional imperative of the ‘progress of Science and the useful Arts’, intended to benefit the
public, has been sabotaged by private capital with organized access to the legislative process.”
188

This becomes relevant following the collapse of the Doha round of multilateral trade talks

in July 2008 and the rise of FTAs deals. 189 The paper appraised the international economic law
regime, through the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975 by fifteen contiguous states in West
Africa, to promote inter-regional trade and remove all barriers to labor, capital and ultimately
establish a single currency for its fifteen countries. An analysis was carried out on the
implementation of the goals of ECOWAS, and the modification of its treaty through additional
protocols; to guarantee, peace, security and democracy in West Africa as a sine qua non for
engaging the global economic community in a symbiotic relationship. The paper concludes that
ECOWAS has achieved peace and democracy in West Africa, despite limited resources, but its
percentage share of world trade fell from 1.6 per cent in 1980 to 0.6 per cent in 2006, excluding
oil exporting members. The paper observes that ECOWAS has a lot of homework to do in
improving the quality of public infrastructure, access to credit by entrepreneurs, in order to
promote regional trade and access to the global economy.
“Despite its numerous initiatives ECOWAS is still not an economic success.”190 It
has evolved into an FTA as opposed to its ambitious goal of a customs union. 191

It needs

committed and visionary leadership on the part of ECOWAS Heads of State to judiciously apply
187

Mathew Schaefer, Ensuring That Regional Trade Agreements Complement The WTO System: US Unilateralism A
Supplement To WTO Initiatives? 10 no.3 JIEL585, 586(2007).
188
Ruth L. Okediji, The Limits of Development Strategies at the Intersection of Intellectual Property and Human
Rights, in Intellectual Property, Trade and Development: Strategies to Optimize Economic Development in TRIPS‐
Plus Era,355, 381(Daniel Gervais ed.,2007)
189
Afta Doha: Should free traders applaud the rise of preferential trade deals?, 388 no.8596The Economist, 85‐
86(September 6, 2008)
190
Kofi Oteng Kufour, The Institutional Transformation of Economic Community of West African States. 127(2006)
191
International Economic Co‐operation, 25, no.1 ICLQ 236‐237 (1976).

30

state resources to improve transportation, energy supply and unknot the mercantilist rules of
origin hindering intraregional commerce in manufactured goods. This will unleash the
entrepreneurial spirit of citizens of West Africa who had traded for centuries, before the Berlin
Conference 192 imposed boundaries upon time tested West African commerce. “One draws
consolation from the fact that throughout Africa there is today a growing awareness of the need
for meaningful economic integration at regional and sub-regional levels as the only way of
solving the problems created by the division of the African continent into a number of
economically non-viable States.” 193
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